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State, Public Goods and Reform 
General introduction 
State plays the major role in any reform process. Because of that, a much wider concept 
has to be used than that of a provider of public goods, although that remains to be one of 
its crucial functions. Though there is a sense in which the state itself reforms as a 
consequence of the development in the markets and in the society,
1 and especially in the 
international environment,
2 it is still the case that the reform process has to be, at least 
partly, initiated and guided by the state as the central policy-making and policy-
implementing institution. What goes on for reforms, goes for failures of reforms too. 
Though successful reforms are perhaps a more satisfying subject, it may even be true that 
more is learned from failures. Within these wider concepts of the nature of the state and 
reform the narrower approach to the role of the state as a provider of public goods can be 
discussed too. Our main aim here is to define concepts, survey some of the more 
important trends in the literature and suggest topics for research.  
 
In this paper, we look at the state from a number of different angles, discuss in particular 
cases where it is weak or has failed, and use the examples from the Balkans to elucidate 
topics that could be useful for further research in this general area. We rely on the recent 
experience of the political and economic developments of the Balkans to illustrate the more 
general claims we make. The reliance on the Balkan experience is justified by the fact that 
in a relatively small region a great variety of processes of state-formation, reform 
programmes and international involvement can be found. Rather than relying on cross-
country analyses, which tend to be removed both from general theoretical considerations 
and from particular cases, the reliance on a specific, though rather representative, regional 
cases can have certain methodological advantages.
3  
 
The very varied experiences and range of initial conditions one sees in the Balkans make 
them almost a laboratory g enerating relevant generalizations for a wide variety of 
economies and allowing comparisons of policies and outcomes. Thus this relatively small 
region provides important lessons for all economies facing extensive institutional 
restructuring and capacity building, changing role of the state and provision of public goods 
as well as those seeking policies aimed at generating modern economic growth. But above 
all the experiences of the Balkan economies are especially interesting because of their 
history of varied failures, repeated attempts of reform, meandering non-linear policies and 
dashed great expectations. Since many economies exhibit one or, alas, more than one of 
                                                                 
1   Which is mainly the topic dealt with in the theories of modernization and sociology of development in general. 
2   On this see a very interesting new major treatment in Bobbitt, 2002.  
3   More on the difference between the methodology used in cross-country studies and those in case studies see Rodrik, 
2002. 2 
these features using the Balkan as area for drawing examples of the more general 
statements seems justified. 
 
The paper is divided into three parts. In the first, the general role of the state and its relation 
to reforms are discussed with the special reference to the issue of legitimacy. In the 
second, the concepts of failed and weak states are discussed in greater detail with special 
reference to the provision of public goods under such circumstances. In the third and 
shortest section, the relation between the state, public goods and economic growth is 
explored. We conclude with a discussion of some of the issue that we think would be most 
useful for future research. 
 
 
1  State, legitimacy and reform 
Introduction 
Economic justification for state action is based on the concept of market failure. For 
reasons of symmetry, it would be useful if the political justification of the autonomy of the 
markets is based on the concept of state failure. The notion of state failure, however, can 
have a different meaning, or rather significance, than that of market failure. It can imply the 
need to extend the working of the market to areas of public concern as it can mean that the 
public sector is not functioning in the way that is in accordance with the idea of the state or 
with that of good public governance. In particular, a state may fail to provide certain public 
goods, it may compete for the supply of public goods with the private sector, or the supply 
of public goods may be completely privatized, as in the case of the capture of a state by 
special interest groups. 
 
There is of course a difference between a failed state and a state failure, but there are also 
some similarities. Here, in the first part of this paper, the concept of the state will be 
discussed first, the issue of state-failure will be tackled parallel with that, and than some 
specific issue about the role of public governance in development and reform will be 
analysed. Then, in the second part of this paper, these ideas will be developed further and 
applied to the states in the Balkans. 
 
 
Defining the state 
Max Weber defined the state as the monopoly of the legitimate use of force. All the three 
characteristics – monopoly, legitimacy, force or power – are of importance.  
 3 








The use of coercive force has to be legitimate, which means that it has to be either legal or 
accepted in some way by the citizens.  
 
The idea of legitimacy is crucial not only for Weber’s concept of state, but in general. The 
notion refers to the paradox of public governance best seen in a democracy. Legitimacy 
means that state coercion is somehow accepted, in the case of democracy even voluntarily 
accepted. There are a number of ways to conceptualize this relationship between the 
government and the governed, but there is no doubt that the idea of legitimacy captures 
the essential characteristic of public governance. States can obviously provide public and 
other goods without being legitimate. Those that do, may not be considered to be failed 
states, even though they fail to be legitimate. Legitimate states, on the other hand, can also 
be failed ones, their legitimacy notwithstanding. Thus, there are three independent notions: 
that of legitimacy, that of efficiency and that of the specific ways in which both are or are 
not supplied. 
 
This definition of the state does not refer directly to what it is it that a state does. However, 
given that it monopolizes the legitimate use of force, that implies that the state at least 
supplies security. Of course, if its monopoly is not legitimate, it may be a source of 
insecurity, indeed of repression for its citizens, as clearly totalitarian states were and are. 
The reference to legitimacy does indirectly point to legality, so that it could be assumed that 
a state would be supplying legal goods, which in the first place would mean justice. Simply 
supplying rules and order would not necessarily satisfy the demands for legitimacy, as 
again was and is the case with totalitarian states. In order for the legal order to be 
considered to be legitimate, it has to be related in some way to the idea of justice, though 
what is meant by that may be very different in different states. 
 
Except by implying that the state supplies security and obliquely referring to justice, this 
definition of the state does not indicate what would be the economic functions of the state? 
The idea of justice suggests the role of distribution, as it is hard to conceptualize the idea of 
justice that does not imply some kind of distribution, and that is certainly an economic 
                                                                 
4   This does not mean that the state has to be centralized. It can be a federation or even a confederation. However, 
competitive supply of force or power is excluded. 
5   That, again, does not mean that it cannot enter into contractual relations with its citizens or with firms and other 
organizations. However, laws and the whole legal system apply to the citizens and all the other legal persons 
unconditionally. 4 
function too. But, a state will also be regulating the economic as well as every other 
behaviour, which means that it will also have an allocative function. It will also be using 
resources and the way it will do that will have consequences for the general economic 
developments, which means that the state will have a stabilizing role, if it chooses to 
exercise it (it can also have a destabilizing role as is well known). And these indeed are the 
three main economic functions of the state as identified in the public finance literature.
6 
 
To fulfil them, the state relies on regulation and trade, fiscal and monetary policies, though 
some or all of them can be shared with other states or delegated to shared or even 
international institutions. These are highly complex functions and policies and cannot be 
treated in any detail here. But it is certainly true that the level of involvement of states in 
economic activities has grown dramatically over the course of the last hundred years or so. 
How these functions are performed and what are their main consequences is the central 
subject of public economics and also of political economy and development economics. 
 
Thus, at a minimum, state supplies two public goods: security and perhaps justice. In 
addition, it affects the allocation and distribution of resources and the stability and growth of 
their supply. For that, it relies on laws and other regulations and uses economic policy 
instruments that come down to trade, fiscal and monetary ones. As an agent, it is a 
monopoly that uses coercion. All of the above it can do in a legitimate or illegitimate ways. 
It is assumed that legitimacy is useful for the efficiency of a state and especially for its 




A state may fail to meet one or all of the three Weberian requirements. Its monopoly may 
be contested in a more or less violent manner. It may not be able to implement its 
decisions even by force and may have to negotiate its authority with the citizens or with 
their organizations and associations. It may have a monopoly over the use of force, but it 
may not be legitimate. Or it may not satisfy all three of these criteria at the same time. 
These failures will give rise to different types of failed states.
7 
 
The lack of legitimacy was sometimes seen as the least troublesome from the point of view 
of the efficiency of public governance. An authoritarian government may lack legitimacy, 
but it may be able to make decisions and to rule. It may be argued that the important thing 
is whether the decisions it is taking are right and whether it can be expected to evolve into 
a legitimate government in time. As a rule, however, the lack of legitimacy has to be 
                                                                 
6   The classical formulation is in Musgrave… 
7   Here only some most general comments on state failures will be given. More on failed states will be found in the 
comments in the second part of this paper. Also, some aspects of state failure, like corruption and state capture will be 
treated in other places in this paper. 5 
compensated for with the increased use of force and coercion. Which then does not 
guarantee that the decisions taken will be the right ones and that the transition to some 
form of a legitimate government will be a smooth one. In any case, the issue of the 
demand and supply of legitimacy is certainly the crucial one.
8 
 
The state may fail to be forceful or powerful. In fact, the use of force is only one way to 
insure the unconditional implementation of government’s decisions. M ore than on force, 
governments rely on laws and administrative measures. That is, they rely on the 
functioning of the judiciary and on the efficiency of its bureaucracy. The fact that the 
government has to be obeyed means that force can be used to coerce p eople into 
behaving in the desired way, but the less it is actually used the better the functioning of the 
public governance actually is. The failure of government’s power is thus twofold. It can fail 
to elicit routine compliance and it can fail to have power to enforce its decisions. 
 
The latter may be because it does not have the monopoly over public governance. It has 
been argued that this monopoly is important from the point of view of efficiency. The so-
called stationary bandit, i.e., a ruler with the monopoly of the use of force on certain 
territory is going to deliver higher welfare to his or her subjects than the so-called roving 
bandit, which is the one that is competing with other bandits over the power to extract rents 
from the ever changing territories and population.
9 Whether the competition is better than 
monopoly is a somewhat more complicated issue, however. The costs of both, of course, 
have to be taken into account. 
 
The contest over state’s monopoly of power can have quite a number of causes, some of 
which have been analysed within the dichotomy between greed and grievance.
10 Some 
states lose authority because they are not just. Some fall victim to the greed of fighting 
factions, especially over the control of natural resources. Clearly, some of the failed states 
are those that disintegrate into the war of all roving bandits against each other. 
 
 
Public and other goods 
These are areas in which major types of state failures can occur. Others have to do not so 
much with the sources and strengths of state’s authority but with the content of state’s 
actions. In a very broad sense, the state provides for basic security and justice, as is 
almost implied in the Weberian definition. These two public goods are not unrelated. 
                                                                 
8   In the mainstream political philosophy, the emergence of a state is explained within the theory of social contract. In that 
context, the legitimacy of a state is derived from the fact that it is based on the original social contract. Though this is 
methodologically useful, it has limited usefulness in empirical explanations. A very interesting recent literature on that is 
the one which discusses the so-called “political Coase theorem”. For a recent paper see Acemoglu (2002).  
9   The idea was introduced by Mancur Olsen. The foundational analysis is probably the one to be found in Nozick (1994) 
10   See Paul Collier and much of the work done within World Bank’s programme on civil wars and ethnic conflicts. 6 
Security can be threatened if there is no justice and justice can hardly be expected to be 
delivered if basic security is not provided for. The very fact that there is a monopoly on the 
use of force and especially if that use is legitimate, may be seen as a guarantee to a 
certain extent that there will be some basic security. Of course, if the state does not use its 
powers against its citizens. Legitimacy is precisely what should constrain the behaviour of 
the state. 
 
The supply of legitimacy in recent history has been connected with the constitutionality of 
state power. The key difference between constitutional and unconstitutional governments 
is not whether they have written constitutions or not. Max Weber wrote on the first Russian 
constitution as providing a “façade constitution”. Not only because it did not look as if there 
was any intention to implement it, but also primarily because it did not conform to the 
modern idea of constitutionality. Which is that of constraining the state power over its 
citizens. This takes the form of the respect and protection of basic individual rights. Also, it 
allows for the autonomy of the civil society. Only within these constraints, the government 
can expect the routine compliance of the people with its exercise of state’s power. Which is 
to say,  its use of power will be legitimate. Weber identified other types of legitimate 
authority, but it is clear today that the constitutionally based legal system is the only 
sustainable source of legitimacy. 
 
Apart from the basic political functions of a state, its economic functions are usually 
classified to encompass those of allocation, distribution and stabilization. Allocation is 
affected mostly by the regulatory powers of the state, which include those of setting up 
firms and agencies that supply public or private or other goods and services. Distribution is 
affected mainly through the fiscal function of the state. While economic activity is stabilized 
through the use of practically all of the economic functions of the state, but more 
specifically by its monetary policy.  
 
The justification for the existence of these public functions is based, in the final analysis, on 
the idea of market failures. Markets may fail to supply certain goods, among them 
especially the so-called public goods. Without going into the details of the theory of public 
goods, which is anyway standard nowadays, it suffices here to say that markets may 
clearly fail to supply certain goods, which justifies the allocative function of the government. 
They may fail to distribute income in socially desirable way, which may necessitate the 
distributive role of a government. And they may not provide stability and especially 
sustainable growth, which again justifies the stabilizing role of governments. In one way or 
another, all these goods that markets do not supply or do not supply in the desired way, 
can be subsumed under the supply and demand of public goods. Thus, apart from security 
and justice, which a state supplies, or fails to supply, equality and stability are also goods 
that a state supplies or fails to supply. 
 7 
Within that context, the state can be seen as having a developmental function, i.e., the 
function of supplying the public good called development. In exercising this function, by 
among other things supplying public and other goods and services, the state can act as an 
entrepreneur, a manager, an owner and a provider of those goods and services. Some 
major changes in the thinking on these roles of the state have taken place since the 
collapse of socialism, however. The most important one perhaps being the increased role 
that the rule of law plays in development. 
 
 
Legitimacy and reform 
The state is of course the one agency that can supply the rule of law. Theoretically, the 
value of the rule of law can be questioned. It can also be argued that it can be supplied 
privately. This is not the prevalent opinion, however. In fact, the opinion has moved very 
much into the opposite direction. It has become increasingly accepted that the rule of law 
plays a very important part in the initiation and the implementation of reforms. In fact, it is 
now believed that the reforms should start with the strengthening of the rule of law. 
 
The other reason is that the state has to initiate and implement reforms and thus the issue 
of legitimacy of what it is doing becomes quite essential. How is legitimacy acquired is of 
course the crucial issue. There are, in principle, two approaches to that issue. The one is 
procedural and the other is substantive. The most important example of the procedural 
legitimacy is the one that is acquired in democracy. A government in a democracy gets the 
mandate to introduce certain reforms. Of course, this is not really a very simple matter, and 
the political economy of reforms in democratic states is a very important one.
11 However, 
in principle, the issue of legitimacy of reforms is settled in elections. 
 
The substantive approach is the one which relies on the substance or the quality of 
reforms. It may be believed that, for instance because of the public good problem, there 
will be little or no support for reforms before they are initiated and implemented. Once they 
are, they will be accepted and supported, i.e., the reformist government will have gained 
legitimacy ex post where it did not have it ex ante. At some point, this idea was explicated 
with the concept of the role of technopols, i.e., of technocrats turned politicians. A 
technocrat would take over a post in the government or at the central bank and would 
initiate and implement reforms, which would subsequently gain p olitical support and 
legitimacy at the polling booths. This approach to reforms depends on the assumption that 
at least some reforms are a technical rather than a political matter. 
 
                                                                 
11   An extensive treatment is in Roland, 2000. A good treatment of the failures to supply rule of law is in Hoff and Stiglitz, 
2002, and Hoff, 2000a. 8 
Both approaches to the political economy of reforms have had to be qualified significantly 
in recent years. Democracies have sometimes failed to produce the needed demand for 
reforms while technopols have sometimes failed both in terms of the success of their 
reforms as well as in the ability to mobilize political support and have thus often failed to 
gain legitimacy for their reformist actions and intentions. Clearly, reforms are a political and 
not a purely technocratic matter, so the issue of legitimacy has to be addressed if they are 
to succeed and to be sustained. 
 
The issue of legitimacy can be seen to be even more important when one considers the 
fact that there is always a reformist path that is available to the policy makers. 
Theoretically, in the democratic setting, due to the theorem of the agenda setter, which is 
an implication of the more general Arrow theorem in social choice, there is always a path of 
reforms that can be supported by the majority, albeit a changing one. Of course, in more 
general settings, agenda setting power may be shared by different influential minorities. 
From that point of view, the central issue of reforms is that of sequencing. However, the 
failures of reforms in many instances show that these agenda setting powers are not a 
technical, but a political matter. And that is will mean that it will have to have a necessary 
degree of legitimacy otherwise the reforms may fail or may become unsustainable and 
thus may be reversed or sidetracked. Legitimacy in question may not be a democratic one, 
though an argument could be made, based on the research in the public choice tradition, 
that over time, sustainable reforms or rather processes of modernization require the 
emergence of democratic legitimacy. 
 
 
The quality of public governance 
The theory of state is almost inevitably normative. Whether one has in mind political 
economy, public choice or social choice theories, they all combine positive analysis with 
some kind of realistic utopia, as Rawls has called it.
12 Even when the issues of market 
allocation of resources are discussed the normative element cannot be eliminated. The key 
concept of Pareto efficiency testifies to that. This is even more the case when it comes to 
the issues of distribution, i.e., to the issues of public finance more concretely. Both the 
determination of the level and structure of public expenditures and of the tax regime are 
inextricably connected with the notions of justice, fairness, equality and equity. These 
notions are also used to assess the quality of government. 
 
What does that mean? Vito Tanzi, after discussing the role of the state, says the following: 
“I will define the quality of the public sector as the characteristic that allows the government 
to pursue its objectives in the most efficient way”.
13 This definition is purely instrumental. 
                                                                 
12   See for the latest statement Rawls, 2001. 
13   See Tanzi 1999. 9 
The objectives referred to there  are to be found in the public policy pursued, which is 
determined within the political process. He says that the distinction between the public 
policy, which includes a set of policies, and the public sector, which consists of the set of 
instruments that i mplement those policies, is artificial. It is probably not even useful. 
Though in many countries there is a distinction between the policy-making bodies and the 
administration or the bureaucracy, it is hard to see that the whole of the public sector can 
be understood in that way.  
 
The one reason why the relation between the public sector and public policy cannot be 
usefully separated has to do with the principal-agent problem involved. This problem is the 
one that is captured by the notion of legitimacy. The state has the power to coerce its 
citizens into behaving in a certain way, but it does it on their behalf. Thus, though in every 
concrete case, or rather during the normal workings of the state, the state is the principal 
and the citizen is the agent, from the point of view of the legitimacy of state’s actions, it is 
the other way around. Therefore, it is not enough for a state to function efficiently; it has to 
have the proper legitimacy. 
 
 
Public and private partnership  
The other problem is that the public and private spheres are inter-related. For instance, let 
us take the case of a commercialized public firm or bank. It may be argued that the goods 
they produce or services they render are those that the public policy makers want them to 
make or perform, while the aim of that firm or that bank or rather of its management may 
be to make profits for the government. From that it cannot be concluded that the 
government’s aim is to make profits when it sets up that concrete firm or bank. These two 
goals may in fact coincide and that may be the most efficient way to perform that particular 
public function, but the goals of the policy making body and the state firm or bank are 
clearly different. They of course may be in conflict because the question can be raised why 
is that part of the public sector not privatized if it is a profit making one? 
 
The example with a commercialized public firm can be used to look some more into the 
issue of public and private partnership. This is a rather key issue in the post-socialist 
thinking on the role of the public sector. In a sense, it may be argued that as soon as profit 
can be made, it should be up to the private competitive business to go after that type of 
business. The state should retreat into the role of a regulator, but should not act as an 
entrepreneur. Alternatively, the business should be conducted on the basis of budget 
management. A state, on this thinking, should be a budget centre and not a profit centre. 
This is a neat distinction, but it cannot be always maintained. Indeed, recently, the idea of 
public and private partnership in transition and development has become quite a popular 
one. 10 
This interconnection of public and private interests is the key one, and though it is not new, 
there are new ways that it has been analysed in recent times. These analyses are at the 
initial stage at this moment, but they will inevitably become more concrete because the 
neat distinctions between the public and the private sectors are not really satisfactory either 
in their normative sense or in their empirical applicability. This analysis of the public and 
private partnership gets even more complicated if the distinction between public and 
private goods is simultaneously introduced. Public and private agents can cooperate both 
in the supply of public as well as of private goods. As public and private goods will, at least 
to some extant, be complements, very complex issues of for instance regulation of 
infrastructure (including net-bound infrastructure) investments will be involved. To this, the 
international dimension should be added to see the full complexity of the role of the state 
that emerges. In that context, weakness, both financial and legal, of a state is a very 
serious impediment to reforms and development. 
 
 
2  Bringing the state up 
Introduction 
The recurrence of theoretical controversies about the precise definition of “the state,” the 
most appropriate strategy of analysing “state capacity” and the heuristic value of the 
concept of “state weakness” should not make us oblivious to an obvious and simple fact: 
virtually all scholars who have spent some time researching post-communism agree that - 
cross-country differences duly acknowledged – quite a number of post-communist states 
are malfunctioning in some fundamental ways. That now the state is “weaker” than before, 
which may not be meant in a negative way, and that it is “weaker” than it should be, which 
is usually meant as a criticism, these are among the very few empirical and normative 
claims about many post-communist countries which would hardly engender serious 
dissent.
14  
 “They may not provide liberty”, commented Huntington on communist states, “but they do 
provide authority. They do create governments that can govern” /Huntington, 1968/. A 
decade after the collapse of communism, the state of the post-communist state is quite 
different. These states may try to provide liberty but they often fail because they are unable 
to provide authority. They do not create governments that can govern. Why some transition 
countries, for instance most of those to be found in the Balkans, fail to create governments 
that can govern and how the vicious circle of state weakness can be broken is the central 
question of this part of the paper. 
 
 
                                                                 
14   See Holmes (1996), Przeworski (1995), Amsden, Kohanowicz and Taylor (1994), Burawoy (1997), Kohanowicz (1994), 
O’Donnell (1993), Stark (1995), McFaul (1995). 11 
State and reform 
In 1997 Global Development Report “The State in the Changing World” World Bank re-
introduced the state as a major development actor. The new development paradigm 
outlined by the Report came as a response to the failure of the state dominated 
development on one side and the failure of the experiments with “the spontaneous birth of 
capitalism” on the other. The failure of the state socialism was the most powerful illustration 
of the limits and dangers of the state dominated development. The failures of the post-
communist transition in countries like Russia, on the other side, proved the point that the 
functioning state is a necessary pre-condition for the efficiency of the market and not an 
outcome of the work of the market. The Report stressed that development requires an 
effective state one that plays “a catalytic, facilitating role, encouraging and complementing 
activities of private business and individuals” /World Bank, 1997/. 
 
The four key developments that provoked World Bank’s re-thinking of the role of the state 
were: 
–  The collapse of the communist system and of the socialist version of the 
developmental state that was fashionable even outside of the socialist block in 1960s 
and 1970s. 
–  The fiscal crisis of the welfare state in the West and practical impossibility to export a 
version of the social democratic state to the developing countries. 
–  The successful role of the state in the East Asian miracle that proves that a state is a 
critical player in the process of development.  
–  State collapse and the escalating need for humanitarian intervention that has boomed 
with the end of the Cold War. It was recognized that intra-state and not inter-state 
conflicts are the major risk for the global stability in the end of the 20
th century. 
 
In theoretical terms, the Report summarized the academic consensus that was born in the 
1980s around the idea of the relative autonomy of the state as a developmental actor. 
Marxist and pluralist interpretations denying autonomous role of the state were 
marginalized. It was recognized that state could not be reduced to an “instrument of 
dominant class interests” /Evans, Rueschmeyer, Skocpol, 1985/. State was discovered as 
an institution and as a social actor. It was distinguished for its territorial and centralizing 
character /Mann, 1987/. 
 
World Bank’s analytical perspective was expressed with the notion of “effective state”.
15 
Effective state was introduced both as a normative and descriptive concept. Trying to 
bypass “big government” versus “small government” debate authors of the Report defined 
                                                                 
15   Which is also reflected in Tanzi’s definition of the quality of the public sector quoted above. 12 
effective state as a state where ambitions are matched with capabilities /World Bank, 
1997/. The state capabilities were defined as “the ability to undertake and promote 
collective actions efficiently” /World Bank, 1997/. In the view of the World Bank the 
expansion of the state that has taken place under two different ideological systems in the 
period of the Cold war has reached its limits. Avoiding the scholastic debate about the 
proper size of the state, the Report underlined the complex relationship between ambitions 
and capabilities as the defining nature of the effective state. Report concentrated its 
interest on how the budget revenues are raised and how the budget is spent. The 
underlying assumption was that “the budget is the skeleton of the state stripped of all 
misleading ideologies” /Goldschied/  
 
Achieving the effective state thus implied two reform strategies: 
–  Optimizing the size by matching ambitions with capabilities. The critics of the Bank 
called it the “withdrawal of the state”.  
–  Raising state capabilities by re-invigorating state institutions. Donors’ programmes 
called this strategy “institution-building”. 
 
Post-communist countries were faced with the task of smartly downsizing direct 
government involvement while improving their bureaucratic capacity. To this, greater stress 
on the rule of law and the strength of institutions and of the civil society was later added. 
That coincided with the recognition that not only the state, but also the whole set of 
institutions are important for development. 
 
 
Welfare state or farewell state 
The years that passed after the publication of “The State in the Changing World” 
questioned the usefulness of the effective state approach. The reform strategies designed 
around the idea of effective state assume a kind of functioning state as given. In reality the 
proliferation of the governments that cannot govern questions the ability of a post-
communist state to provide authority and to deliver rule of law. It turned out that fiscal 
sociology is not enough for formulating strategies for reforming or re-creating the state after 
communism. The study of the state could not be reduced to the studies of the state 
budgets. The major developments that shaped the thinking of our paper are: 
–  The crisis of the East Asian model that followed the 1998 crisis of these economies 
and that replaced the notion of effective state with much more normative concept of 
good governance as a precondition for development. 
–  The failures in the different parts of the world to overcome state weakness and the 
emergence of sustainable weak states. 13 
–  The rising security costs of the existence of failed states in the context of the global 
terrorist threat. This new developments provoked the debate on liberal imperialism and 
nation building from outside. 
–  The transformation of European integration into instrument of state building in the 
Balkans. 
 
These new developments re-formulated some of the key questions that were raised in the 
1997 Report. At the moment, as already mentioned, there is the shared view that many 
post-communist states are weaker than they were before and, what is more important, 
weaker than they should be. Public trust in the institutions in for instance Balkan post-
communist states is generally low /International IDEA/. Both from inside and from outside, 
Balkan countries are seen as corrupt and inefficient. Respective governments only 
nominally control sizable parts of their territories. How to overcome state weakness and 
failed states equilibrium are questions that await their analytical answers. In addressing 
these questions we will concentrate our attention on the experience of the Balkans in the 
last decade. There are several reasons for recognizing the Balkans as a God given 
laboratory for understanding state failure and state weakness. 
–  For the Balkans 1990s was a process of intensive state building following the 
dissolution of Tito’s Yugoslavia. In the region we can observe un-peaceful coexistence 
between the traditional strategies for building modern nation-state with imposed 
constraints and attempts to transform the process from nation state building into 
member state building /members of EU/. 
–  The region presents a strange mixture of weak states, former failed states and present 
protectorates. 
–  The region presents a variety of constitutional choices. 
–  The Balkans is that part of the world where the outside driven state building is most 
intensive and strategic. 
–  The region presents a promising opportunity to understand the failure of the 
international strategies to overcome state weakness. 
–  The involvement of the EU and the existence of EU membership as the unique 
incentives for state-building makes the Balkans the best test for the limits of liberal 
imperialism. 
 
Perhaps the following classification of political regimes in the Balkans could be useful: 
  Countries approaching an advanced stage of democratization:
16 Romania and 
Bulgaria. 
                                                                 
16   By democratization the process of building of democracy is meant. It is taken to include at least two or three more or 
less free and fair elections and at least one orderly change of the parties in government. 14 
  Countries in apparently sustainable process of democratization: Croatia. 
  Countries in the (post-crisis) process of democratization: Albania. 
  Countries at the start of the process of democratization: Yugoslavia (Serbia and 
Montenegro). 
  Countries recovering from a severe political crisis (breakdown of democratization): 
Macedonia. 
  Countries with significant international security and political  presence (quasi-
protectorates): Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
  Territories at the start of the process of democratization: Montenegro. 
  Territories that are de facto international protectorates: Kosovo. 
  Political entities within quasi-protectorates: Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and 
Republic of Srpska. 
  Divided cities, out of control cities and villages or cities under special international care: 
a number of them in Kosovo (e.g., Kosovska Mitrovica), Bosnia and Herzegovina (e.g., 
Brcko) and Macedonia (e.g., Sipkovica). 
 
Clearly, the types of failed or weak states that emerge from this classification span most of 
what can be found in the rest of the world too. The difference, perhaps, in the level and 
extant of international involvement, though the same can be said for a number of other 
regions. Otherwise, in the Balkans, as in the development world as a whole, there are 
countries in the process of democratization, which may not be a sustainable one, there are 
those that are beset with a protracted political crisis, stemming from a deep internal 
division, there are failed states or territories, that are under one or another type of 
international observation or protection and there are states that are in conflict with their 
neighbours or with the region in which they find themselves. All of these states tend to be 
weak in the sense to be defined below. 
 
 
Defining weak state and failed state 
The notions of “weak state” and “failed state” became critical elements in the current 
discourse on the concept of the state, but in most of the cases they are used as metaphors 
and less often as analytical terms. The notion of a “failed state” is used with misleading 
easiness for cases as diverse as Somalia and Russia /RAND, 2001/. A “failed state” is 
assumed to be like an elephant, when you see it you will recognize it. 
 
In the Balkans, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo and Albania in the spring of 1997 were 
defined as failed states. In theoretical terms a failed state represents a form of return to 15 
what Hobbes called the state of nature. Kaplan prefers to describe this new condition as 
“criminal anarchy” /Kaplan, 2001/ 
 
From the perspective of international law “failed state” has three decisive characteristics: 
–  Absence of bodies efficiently representing the state. In other words lack of government 
that can be legitimate partner in the negotiation process. 
–  Intensive violence. 
–  Need for humanitarian intervention. In practical terms it is the decision of the UN 
Security Council to intervene that is used as the practical criteria for enumerating the 
failed state. 
 
In Weberian terms failed state has the characteristics of a non-state. It represents the 
disappearance of the legitimate monopoly of violence over certain territory that formally 
has been recognized as a state. Security and justice as public goods are either not 
provided or provided by illegitimate private agents. Albania in the spring of 1997 represents 
a classical case of state failure. The structures that should have guaranteed the rule of law 
had failed completely.  There was no police, no judicial system. To the extent that 
policemen were to be found on the streets, they were agents of private violence. There 
were a lot of weapons grabbed by the population; the state of insecurity was total. The 
state was neither taxing nor spending. In this sense “failed state” should be contrasted not 
only with functioning state but also with the state of civil war where the war parties control 
parts of the territory of the state and are fighting either to control the other part or to 
consolidate the control over the territory they have. This is not the case with the failed 
states where none of the agents succeeds in establishing monopoly on violence over the 
significant territory of the state. 
 
Overcoming state failure is a major challenge not only for the Balkans. In his reflections on 
the need for liberal imperialism, Robert Cooper singled out the proliferation of failed states 
as the major challenge for the new international order /Cooper/. In his provocative vision of 
the need for new imperialism, Cooper described the current situation as the one in which 
there is a demand for intervention but the supply is absent. In the view of Alain Joxe the 
major characteristic of the new world order is that the world hegemon /US/ is a strange 
type of an empire. US come, but it does not stay. US “does not intend to assume the 
general protection of citizens, only regulates disorder through norms of behaviour 
implanted on their allies” /Joxe, 2002/. This new imperial chaos directly affects the process 
of state building in the Balkans when it comes to the function of the existing protectorates. 
In the case of Kosovo protectorate functions as both an instrument for state building and as 
a legal and administrative corset preventing the emergence of the independent state in 
Kosovo. The situation is even more complicated by the fact that protectorate regimes are 
combined with the forms of democratic representation. Following parliamentary elections in 16 
Kosovo in November 17 we can observe a situation when we do not know how many de 
facto states we have in the Balkans what we know is that they all are democracies. 
 
 
Defining the weak state 
In the World Bank Report “weak state” is interpreted as an ineffective state, state that 
suffers from the mismatch between ambitions and capabilities or the one that suffers from 
low state capacities. But this interpretation of state weakness seems to be insufficient in 
understanding the twists of the post-communist statehood on the Balkans. There are two 
types of analytical questions that await their theoretical answers and both of them define 
two promising research agendas. The first question has to do with the weakening of the 
state in the transition period. The other one has to do with the re-production of the state 
weakness. “It is easier to explain why communism had to fall than why it did”, wrote Adam 
Przeworski. This observation is even more relevant to the process of the collapse of the 
communist state. What happened in the process of transition that explains the collapse of 
the statehood? Did the state collapse as a result of the collapse of the communist type of 
society or was the collapse of communism primarily the collapse of the communist type of 
state? The second question is even more unexplored, and it is still not known why after a 
decade of transition the weak state is re-producing itself in places like the Balkans. 
 
The discussion of the state weakness has long tradition in the theoretical literature. 
“Weberian minded comparativists started labelling states “stronger” or “weaker” according 
to how closely they approximate the ideal type of centralized and fully rationalized 
Weberian bureaucracy, supposedly able to work its will efficiently and without effective 
social opposition” /Evans/. Neo-Marxists will not accept such a definition because for them 
“strong state” is a state with a strong capitalist class that can efficiently articulate its 
interests. In the Weberian sense, Prussia in 19
th century is stronger than US in the same 
period while for the neo-Marxist it will be the opposite. 
 
In his influential work “Weak States, Strong Societies” Migdal defined the strength of the 
state as its ability to penetrate society. In this respect we can define state weakness either 
as the weakness of the autonomous role of the state or as a weakness of its organization 
capacities. The weak state is either captured state or a state with inefficient bureaucracy. In 
“Bringing the State Back In” Evans …have demonstrated that the general judgments about 
the strength of the state can be misleading. They have demonstrated that there is not 
necessarily a positive relationship among different kinds of state capacities. A state can be 
efficient as tax collector and a bad public manager and so on.  
 
The metaphorical use of the notion of a “weak state” has become an obstacle to the study 
of state weakness. In the transition discourse, “state weakness” has been related to the 
shrinking of the state, to the collapse of the health and pension systems, to the inefficiency 17 
of the state bureaucracy. In this sense there is an urgent need for definition of weak state 
that can be analytical tool for understanding the failure of the state in the process of 
transition. For us weak state can be defined as a state that fails to protect the rights of 
citizens and property rights. The failure in providing rule of law is the basic characteristic of 
weak state. 
 
Interpreting the weakness of the post-communist state raises several research questions.  
 
 
The sources of state weakness in the Balkans 
There are four interesting trends of research that try to understand the state weakness as a 
post-communist phenomenon: 
(1)  Already in the beginning of transition Jon Elster and Claus Offe have developed the 
idea that transition societies are facing a triple transition and that the task to build 
simultaneously states, markets and democracies can result in the state failure. Elster-
Offe hypothesis urges for re-reading of the policy sequencing as the major choice to 
be made in the period of transition. Can state weakness be defined as the failure of 
simultaneity? 
(2)  The developments in the Balkans gave rise to more strictly constitutional explanation 
of state failure and the emergence of weak states. Robert Hyden and others have 
interpreted the dissolution of Yugoslavia as an outcome of specific constitutional 
choices that were made in 1960s and 1980s. The current debate on the paralysis of 
the state in Bulgaria predominantly refers to the constitutional choices that were made 
in 1991 constitution. Similar trend can b e noticed with respect to the Macedonian 
constitution and the debate on the Dayton Agreement on Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
(3)  In his insightful analysis of the collapse of Soviet Union Steven Solnick does not use 
the collapse of communism as an explanation for the state weakening. In his view the 
collapse of communism was basically a break of communist state and manifestation of 
the weakness of the central power. “In effect, Soviet institutions were victimized by the 
organizational equivalent of a colossal “bank run”, in which local officials rushed to 
claim their assets before the bureaucratic doors shut for good. As in a bank run, the 
loss of confidence in the institution makes its demise a self-fulfilling prophecy. Unlike a 
bank run, the defecting officials were not depositors claiming their rightful assets, but 
employs of the state appropriating state assets” /Solnick, 1999/. In this interpretation 
state weakness is result of the state failure of communism, a kind of a post-run 
condition. 
(4)  There is also a trend that views weakening of the state as the strategic outcome of the 
interests of post-communist elites. Weak state creates the crime without punishment 18 
environment that is the optimal environment for the Great Re-Distribution that took 
place in the last decade. 
 
A weak state is not necessarily a state that does not dispose of significant resources. In the 
Balkans, some states are weak in that sense too. Thus, Albania and the territory of Kosovo 
are weak in the key sense of the rule of law being weak or very weak, but they are also 
weak in the sense that they do not influence the economic developments very much. This 
can be seen from the level and structure of their public finances. Tax revenues are 
hovering around 10 to 15 percent of GDP while public expenditures are larger by about 10 
percent of GDP, which is effectively the fiscal deficit. Most of public investments are part of 
the international reconstruction effort or are financed from international aid or with soft-
loans. This could be taken to be the prototype of a weak state. 
 
Other states in the region collect significant resources in public revenues and have even 
larger public expenditures. Thus, a number of states or territories spend more than 50 
percent of their GDPs via the budget. They also collect a lot of revenues. In that sense, a 
number of Balkan states cannot be called weak. However, as in other developing 
countries, the sources of revenues and the structure of expenditures show significant 
weaknesses or inefficiencies. There is no need to go into details, so only some general 
characterizations should be given. 
 
On the revenue side, the usual problem with the tax base being rather narrow can be 
found. There is a large and growing informal economy and the taxes are collected mostly 
from state owned companies and from consumers. To this the revenues from tariffs should 
be added, which are essential in a number of cases. 
 
On the expenditure side, a lot of money is spent on wages and salaries, on the military, on 
transfers and subsidies and relatively little on public investments. Thus, public expenditures 




Modes of state weakness 
Following the theoretical discussion on the strength of the state we can separate two 
different modes of state weakness. State can be weak as a result of losing its relative 
autonomy with respect to civil society and the result will be a captured state. State can also 
be weak as a result of total inefficiency of its bureaucracy. In the current research on 
corruption these two modes of state weakness are well distinguished. In their influential 
study “Seize the Day, Seize the State” Kaufman and Hellman have demonstrated that 
state capture and administrative corruption are not identical and that it is the state capture 
                                                                 
17   More on that in Gligorov, 2000. 19 
that has more negative effect on the business environment and the confidence in 
institutions. In our definition of weak state it is the state capture much more than 
administrative corruption that determines the essence of state weakness. 
 
Still, corruption is not an unimportant phenomenon, quite to the contrary. The sources of 
corruption are many, but some have to be attributed to the state interference with the 
allocative role of the markets. Also, as indicated above, some of the Balkans states 
transfer a lot of money. This is another sign of state weakness as identified in the 
theoretical literature also. Political unstable countries tend to spend more from the budget 
because they need to buy the support of different strata of the society. In the Balkans, the 
population is rather old, so transfers to pensioners and other recipients of social welfare 
are quite significant. Also, unemployment is high, so subsidies are also significant. Finally, 
the large number of unemployed fuels the large informal market. In some cases, between 
one third and one half of the GDP is produced in the informal economy. This large-scale 
tax evasion leads to the large demand for bribes and thus to the pervasive and persistent 
corruption. There is nothing special about the Balkan corruption, so whatever is known 
about the effects of corruption applies to the Balkans too. 
 
One is of special importance. That is the fact that it is very difficult to root out pervasive 
corruption. Though the presence of corrupt practices tends to be overestimated, there is no 
doubt that it is very much a reality. The effect on the quality of public governance is 
obvious. There is clearly no way in which it will be efficient in the sense of the World Bank 
and it is not going to be functional too, as it will not perform some of the functions of the 
sate almost by definition. However, a corrupt state is not necessarily a state that is out of a 
legal, economic and social equilibrium. Indeed, corruption is a way in which certain public 
functions get privatized and that arrangement can be even Pareto-optimal. It can also be 
equilibrium one even if it is Pareto-inferior. All of this is not unknown in the theoretical 
economics of development as the subject is almost presumed on the existence of multiple-
equilibria that could be Pareto-ranked.  
 
Indeed, this one of the justifications for the important role that a state should play in the 
development process. However, the principal-agent problem is crucial here and the case of 
corruption exemplifies it very well. The state should act against corruption, i.e., the corrupt 
agent should be the main agency in the eradication of corruption. There is clearly a 
problem of will and determination involved. 
 
 
Overcoming state weakness 
In the current debate there are two principal approaches with respect to state weakness. 
The first is the administrative approach that is promoted by EU and other donors and it can 
be summarized as bureaucracy building. It implies that external conditionality coming from 20 
EU will be the instrument for successful state building. On one side EU is re-capturing the 
captured state turning the legislative process into a process of harmonizing local legislation 
to the legislation of the EU. On the other side the very process of accession creates the 
need of efficient bureaucratic elite that will be the skeleton of the future Weberian ethos. 
The essence of this strategy is designed around maximal strengthening of the autonomy of 
the state. 
 
There is an alternative approach that views the overcoming of state weakness through 
re-politization of the society and increasing the influence of the social interests over state’s 
decision. In this perspective, overcoming state weakness is possible only as an intensive 
democracy building and increasing the representative character of the regimes. Can these 
two strategies work together, under what conditions each of them can break the weak state 
equilibrium are the basic questions to be asked. 
 
 
Transition as state-building 
In our view, the moment has been reached when social sciences are ready to read the 
transition as a state-building exercise and to develop what Gianfranco Poggi calls “a state-
centred understanding of the state,” in other words a clear understanding of “how state 
power is generated and stored” and what factors impact on that process in concrete 
contexts.
18 This understanding does not entail turning the state into the sole factor of post-
communist development. It mandates, however, that the analysis of various “inputs” in the 
political system  - such as the ideology of incumbent elites, international pressures, 
“blueprints” for reforms - be juxtaposed to an interpretation of the internal dynamic within 
the set of institutions concerned with the exercise of the political and economic 
prerogatives of the state. Given the sprawling institutional legacy of communist, this is a 
daunting task. But if properly approached, it will yield better understanding of the causes of 
state weakness in post-communism. And the first step in this respect is the recognition that 
inquiries into the dynamic of evolution/involution of institutional arrangements is more 
important for the analysis of the post-communist state than the critique of specific policies 
designed by temporarily empowered elites.  
 
One of the major insights to be drawn from the literature on state formation is that the 
proposition that state institutions are “there,” available upon demand, is valid only in certain 
times and places.
19 The absence of the state is what makes its reform so difficult. Thus the 
analysis should proceed on the assumption that these institutions have to be re-made. And 
the “re-making” of states - as Tilly points out  - involves “the combining, consolidation, 
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neutralizing, manipulating a tough, complicated and well-set web of political relations.”
20 It 
is these relations that need to be explored more fully. What is the nature of “pro-“ and “anti-
state” coalitions, and what factors have an import on their formation? In what 
organizational forms do these coalitions crystallize and what is it that they fight over? How 
should we think of their failures and successes? What spheres of government are more 
likely to be infested with the virus of destabilization and why?  
 
Another crucial problem from a state-building perspective is the problem of “extraction” or 
“predatory action.” In fact, there is a widely shared consensus in the literature that without a 
proper account of dominant modes of extraction the provenance and functioning of modern 
states will remain obscure.
21 Historically, the institutional origins of modern states - the 
emergence of the administrative agencies and bureaucratic bodies - have been traced to 
the efforts of powerful elites to make extraction a sustainable social process. This set of 
issues should be applied to the study of post-communist state formation in order to explore 
how various tactics are used to establish control over flows of resources and what patterns 




3  State, growth and reform 
Introduction 
The capacities of the state and its strength are important from the point of view of 
growth and development. Even if a state is legitimate and relatively strong, it 
should still not be taken for granted that it will be successful in bringing about the 
necessary reforms and in ultimately reaching the developmental goals that it may 
have. This is partly the consequence of the lack of knowledge that social sciences 
and especially economics can supply. 
 
 
Development and disintegration 
The developmental role of the state was initially discussed within the framework provided 
by Rosenstein-Rodan, Hirschmann and Gernschenkron.
22 It was eventually summarized in 
the idea of a “big bang”. From the point  of view of the role of the state, certainly 
Gerschenkron’s discussion of backwardness is the central one. The idea may be 
expressed in the following way. Assume that capitalist development has not emerged 
spontaneously in a country or a region. Entrepreneurs are scarce and the financial 
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institutions are weak. So, they cannot be the agents of development. What can be the 
functional alternative? The answer is that the state should step in. It can mobilize resources 
and investments. Especially in those areas which are crucial for development but fail to be 
provided for privately. For instance, when it comes to infrastructure development or 
education or even in the case of production of consumer goods and services. 
 
The collapse of the socialist thinking has led to the rethinking of this idea of the 
developmental role of the state. The state came to be distrusted as an entrepreneur, an 
owner and a manager. It was, however, realized that development is still a problem, so 
functional alternatives to the state were found in privatization and liberalization. When 
these ideas were put into the macroeconomic context, the so-called Washington 
consensus set of polices emerged. Without going into the details of this consensus, it 
suffices to say that the ideas of privatization and liberalization were seen as substituting for 
the state in the sense that the private sector will provide for entrepreneurship and 
management and the lack of these resources domestically could be supplemented by the 
reliance on the international market. The latter would provide not only for the added 
demand but also will supply the necessary investments and technology. 
 
This same idea was applied to transition economies. Only later in the process it was 
recognized that rather than spontaneous creation, a process of disintegration can set in.
23 
The sources of disintegration are several. 
 
One is that which emerges with the break up of states.
24 There are quite a number of 
theories of secession and of collapse of states. Not all of them due to disorganization. But 
certainly the disorganization of the centrally planned economies leads not only to the break 
up of large industrial complexes but to the break up of “budget centres” as well. Whether 
the break up of states is an outcome of disorganization or is the cause of disorganization, 
the consequences are similar. Public governance initially suffers. And thus the 
developmental role of the state can hardly be maintained.
25 
 
The other aspects of disorganization have to do with the emergence of large informal 
sectors in the economy. In some cases, three distinct sectors coexist uneasily in a 
transition economy: the state sector, the private sector and the informal sector. The state 
has a rather difficult task to regulate the economy in such circumstances. This state of 
affairs is not really characteristic of economies and states in transition only, but of many 
other developing countries too. Though in the case of transition countries this is the 
consequence of disorganization connected with transition, in other cases it can be 
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connected with the lack of organization in the sense of non-existence and non-emergence 
of appropriate public and civil institutions. 
 
Other aspects of disorganization are also quite important. Especially because they lead to 
the state losing its capacity to initiate and implement reforms. This is the other aspect of 
state role that should be discussed here. With the disillusionment with the developmental 
role of the state came also the belief that its major role as a reformer is mostly negative. It 
was to divest itself from the economy and to open up its internal and external barriers or 
borders to the workings of the market. Initially, it was believed that the social and 
institutional support for these reforms would not be lacking or rather t hat they would 
emerge as the demand for them appears and grows. The experience shows that this was 
not altogether correct. And the reasons are rather fundamental and should not have been 
easy to miss. 
 
 
The special importance of growth/development 
In the final analysis economic policy and everything economics has to say on it is about 
two things. First it is about improving living standards and welfare, which reflect an 
economy’s absolute growth/development capacity, and second it is about economic 
convergence, which reflects an economy's relative growth/development capacity. The 
success with which policies deal with these two issues to a large extent determines the fate 
of policy makers, often even in the short run but certainly in the medium run. In economic 
history there are very few examples where policy makers who generated “modern 
economic growth” (Kuznets, 1955) and convergence lost power. At the same time there 
are many examples of otherwise quite disgusting regimes and policy makers maintaining 
power while they were able to generate high economic growth rates and convergence. The 
Austro-Hungarian Empire in the early 20
th century is perhaps the only example of the 
former (Good, 1984) while Stalinist regimes during the fifties are examples of the latter 
(Estrin and Urga 1997). There are also many examples of policy makers loosing power or 
even of a regime change when growth and convergence stopped. The collapse of socialist 
economies and the transition are largely explained by this (Blanchard 1997). Continuing 
along this vein, one must also note that many policy makers gained power by promising 
growth and lost power when they could not do good on their promises. This is because 
absolute and relative growth issues are intricately built into population expectations and 
hence voting behaviour. This kind of "real world importance" gives absolute and relative 
growth related issues special importance. 
 
Southeast European economies offer an excellent example. The high growth rates during 
the Golden age of European growth made two of them, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, each in its 
own way success stories (see Estrin and Urga, 1997); but with the growth crises from the 
eighties onwards, the regimes lost legitimacy and failed the population's expectations. That 24 
was certainly an important building block leading up to the eventual transformation of the 
nineties. Since then they have undergone massive institutional and sectoral restructuring 
(the transformation) largely with the expectations of growth and convergence. The failure of 
the regime change to deliver “modern economic growth” is, arguably, a major source of 
instability and discussions about failed transformation, second transformation and the like 
(Bicanic and Franicevic 2002). 
 
A discussion of absolute and relative growth performance contains three central issues. 
The first concerns the secular long run growth path of an economy and its determinants. 
The second and more challenging issue concerns path determinacy and whether the 
secular long run absolute and relative growth performance can be improved upon by 
accelerating it and making it socially more acceptable. The third and arguably the most 
challenging is whether the secular growth path can be improved upon and how can this be 
achieved, by what reform strategy and its policy package.  
 
The first two issues could be considered as purely academic and the concern of theoretical 
and empirical economics (covering a wide range of disciplines). The third, in contrast, by its 
nature is both an academic and a policy issue involving social choice. However, since the 
economic profession offers no clear answer to any of the three issues, none of them can 
be considered purely "technical". This in turn means that differences cannot be resolved 
just by economics and economists, with those who are the better professionals (and with 
their theory and empirical results) winning the day. Issues regarding different approaches, 
differences of interpretation and especially various offered pro-active policy solutions 
cannot be resolved by economics alone. 
 
The "technical" ambiguities translate outside economics and into the social environment. 
Here, the complex mixture of population expectations, Krugmanite "growth policy 
entrepreneurs", politicians with political cycles, make the area of discussion even broader 
and the ambiguities even greater. Because of this pressure to abuse growth related issues, 
the economists (and in turn the social environment) should be aware about the nature and 
the scope of the "technical" ambiguities and, equally importantly, where the profession 
offers and does not offer results. 
 
 
The "menu" of results from theoretical and applied economics 
The fact that all three above mentioned aspects do not command a consensus with clear 
answers in the economics profession (and from that point of view are "soft") does not mean 
that economics cannot set boundaries within which a serious discussion can take place. To 
appreciate these boundaries it may be useful to review the relevant results from theoretical 
and empirical economics. 25 
Economic theory offers two dominant and mutually irreconcilable approaches to the issue 
of absolute and relative growth. Each has radically different policy implications  
 
The first, and probably still dominant, is the neoclassical growth model (Solow-Swann, 
dealt with in every major macro and growth textbooks, in the case of the latter Jones, 2002, 
provides a standard presentation while a more technical approach can be found in Barro 
and Sala-I-Martin, 1995), which solves both relative and absolute growth issues at the 
same time. In this view, all economies are converging to a common long run equilibrium 
rate whose growth features are exogenously determined. However, the growth path is 
structurally determined: remove structural differences and the path e conomies are 
converging to becomes the same as well. The convergence is guaranteed by the efficient 
performance of market institutions, complete private property rights and optimizing 
economic agents. Individual economies deviate from this path because of  barriers, 
institutional and others, to the requirements of efficiency. The policy implications of this 
approach are twofold. The first set is passive but clear, see Solow (1997). Since it is 
exogenously determined the features of the long run equilibrium growth rate cannot be 
influenced, so policy is confined to removing anything that is preventing the efficiency of 
markets, private property or limiting agent optimization. These barriers must be removed 
through a policy package. The second set does not concern the growth rate, or absolute 
convergence, but the growth path and structural differences which lead to divergence (see 
Pritchett, 1997), produce club convergence (see Quah, 1996 or Gomulka, 199x) or the lack 
of any general convergence (Islan, 1995). This path can be influenced by two kinds of 
policy choices and thus active policies. The first concerns an optimality problem and the 
second is related to club convergence and to the ability to move from an unwanted into 
more favourable growth club (called club-skipping).  
 
The second and more recent approach is that of endogenous growth approach (Romer-
Rebelo, included in all macro and growth textbook, but often also in a less technical 
manner, e.g., in Jones, 2002, or see for a technically more demanding treatment Aghion 
and Hewitt, 1998), which retains the institutional framework of markets and private property 
in a world of optimizing agents but defines the features of the long run growth rate and 
growth path endogenously through a technological progress generating assumptions. The 
usual technological progress generating assumptions are based on versions of learning-
by-doing or research and development theories, and in either case this makes the long run 
growth path and growth rate subject to choice and thus a policy issue. The approach 
expands the policy scope since, in addition to all the passive and the optimum growth 
policies of the first approach, it also includes active ones in order to determine the long run 
growth rate. This is done through the policy dependence of technological change. But with 
the gain in the ability to choose the long run growth path - and with it the ability to account 
for the very important issues of overtaking and falling behind - comes at a cost of loosing 26 
the ability to discuss non-equilibrium growth and with it the possibility of discussing 
convergence. Another loss is the inability to directly test the validity of the theory.  
 
Regarding the results in standard empirical economics there are three strands: regression 
analysis with growth factors, the residual and global factor productivity and the analysis of 
economic convergence. Over the recent past all three standard strands of empirical growth 
research has led to some important results which have significantly increased the 
understanding of growth and the possible scope for growth policies. 
 
Regarding the first approach, it is probably the case that the mining of panel growth data, 
which started in the early nineties with Barro's seminal paper (Barro, 1991, and Barro, 
1997, and a number of subsequent publications), reached its climax in the mid-nineties 
and has probably come to the end of its productive life. It seems now that the econometric 
techniques and computer capabilities have outgrown the data and the researchers are 
trying to squeeze new results out of increasingly massaged data of ever more dubious 
quality requiring assumptions, which stretch the imagination to the limit. With millions of 
growth regressions (see Sala-i-Martin, 1997) and with the voluminous literature on growth 
regressions (for a survey and more sceptical view see Temple, 1999), researchers have 
used panel data to introduce ever-greater number of new explanatory variables. Except for 
realizing the obvious importance of factor accumulation (physical and human capital and 
labour), and hence of the share of investments/savings, the profession has reached a 
consensus only about another growth factor: international trade (even though the direction 
of causality remains unclear, see Rodriguez and Rodrick,1999). Regarding the other 
growth factors most frequently used in regressions (share of state expenditure, level of 
economic inequality, infrastructure investment, population growth, competitive pressures, 
rule of law, expenditure on research and development) there is no consensus in the 
profession either regarding their importance or their causal links to growth. Various studies 
offer different results, though most economists remain convinced that these should be the 
main growth factors and that more research is needed to show that. In spite of quantitative 
ambiguities, these growth factors have influenced the policy discussion and have had an 
important influence on mainstream economists. Still, because of the existence of these 
ambiguities and under the influence of the dissenters in the profession, the economists 
have started to include other factors, such as the notion of social capital and the 
importance of institutions (for the latter see Rodrik, Subramanian and Trebbi, 2002). 
 
The second strand of research dealt with the factors that contribute to growth (for a survey 
see Temple, 1999). The research in the sixties started with the initial dominance of global 
factor productivity (which was interpreted as technical progress and not as a residual, 
measuring ignorance) with the small influence of factor accumulation. Via "squeezing the 
residual", by introducing new variables (human capital) or redefining traditional ones 
(capital and labour), the research results returned to the 19
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accumulation (Rodrick, 1997) only to recently return back to a pruned resurrection of 
technical progress (Easterly and Levine, 2001).  
 
The third strand of empirical research concentrated on economic convergence. This is the 
only one directly linked to a theoretical approach (the neoclassical model). The results are 
clear. With respect to global convergence no absolute convergence has been found and 
growth rates do not behave as predicted (Pritchett, 1997). But very interestingly growth 
clubs have been found (most importantly for OECD economies) and for limited data sets 
(EU regions, US states, Indian states, Swedish and Japanese counties) convergence 
seems to exist (Quah, 1996 or UN ECE, 2000). Ongoing work is still attempting to show 
that the data, when suitably sanitized, does behave in the manner predicted by the theory. 
 
To these dominant strands of empirical research in mainstream economics, one must add 
another kind of research, which breaches theoretical and applied research and includes 
many disciplines. Because of the apparent "softness", this kind of work is often looked 
down upon by some mainstream economists. The empirical aspects of studies of growth 
can either go under the more impressive title of time series analysis, which is using modern 
econometrics and economic theory, or under the less weighty one of story telling (or even 
worse case studies) in which simpler statistics and economic history have as prominent a 
place as standard economics. Data problems often limit the first approach (Southeast 
Europe is an excellent example where a wealth of data has not yet been reconstructed into 
a "usable" time series framework). This “softer” research has produced a great number of 
important results. For example:  
–  growth/development are disequilibria processes related to points of discontinuity and 
spurts of growth and not a continuous smooth process best described by linearity and 
regressions,  
–  we are yet to find a real world example of successful generation of “modern economic 
growth” in which the state did not have an overriding (if not dominant) role,  
–  growth/development success is not guaranteed, as the number of growth disasters, 
bad equilibria and non-linearities clearly indicate,  
–  research seems also to indicate a frequent lag of institutional development behind 
economic progress,  
–  and in general that growth successes, when they have come, have not been in 
accordance with the current "textbook cases" (e.g. simple identifiable goals, horizontal 
non-discriminating policies, market driven investments, attraction of FDI, transparent 
institutional stability, etc).  
 
Of course these results are still difficult to generalize but arguably the scope for modern 
quantitative techniques will continue to increase and with that the unavoidable high 28 




Where does this leave us: examples from Southeast Europe 
The level of our ignorance makes the growth/development policy-determining environment 
very complex and the political economy of growth extremely challenging. The social 
context makes growth/development issues an area of special concern for the population 
with intense opinions, which in turn provides policy makers with a strong incentive to use 
and possibly abuse the growth/development issue. In any given environment, when it 
comes to the issues of factors of growth/development, economists are typically left with 
results, which are to a large extent theoretically and empirically ambiguous. This is true 
both on the normative and on the positive side. As a result, only some differences and 
abuses of current knowledge can be resolved by "technical" discussions. Many cannot, 
especially some of the more fundamental ones.  
 
One such area of limited ambiguity concerns the role of the state in the context of policy 
issues for economic growth/development. Even disregarding economic history, which 
clearly shows that states have always played a central and active role in 
growth/development, and also disregarding those economic results that indicate that the 
20
th century "growth miracles" (both the European "golden age of growth" and later East 
Asian growth) were heavily dependent on state activities, it is still the case that today's 
mainstream economic analysis does in fact give the state a prominent and active role. Both 
standard economic theories of growth, discussed above, have a role for pro-active policies 
and a large role for passive ones. Concerning the active ones, the exogenous growth 
theories afford the state an active role with regard to convergence clubs and economic 
restructuring, for club skipping and determining long run growth path levels, while the 
endogenous growth theories provide the state with the means for influencing the long run 
growth levels and rates. Both provide a scope for passive policies of eliminating 
inefficiencies, especially market related ones. Empirical results show that of all the 
standard growth factors most are related to some aspect of state activity: 1. infrastructure, 
2. size of state, 3. human capital generation, 4. inequality, 5. rule of law, 6. competitive 
pressures, 7. R&D/technical progress, 8. macroeconomic stability. However, with regard to 
all the state related growth factors, it is important to note that they all involve a matter of 
degree. Too much or too little can act as a barrier, the right amount can be conducive to 
growth. For example regarding infrastructure or human capital generation, too much public 
investment crowds out private investments, but too little acts as a barrier for technology 
absorption and entrepreneurship. For determining the right amount, however, there are no 
fixed rules. It seems that they must be determined on a case-by-case basis. With regard to 
growth/development the "minimalist" state vision is at odds with both the reality and theory. 
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Because of its special position in bridging social and economic considerations, economic 
inequality requires separate consideration. Too low economic inequality levels are viewed 
as having serious negative incentive effects on entrepreneurship and human capital 
investments, while too much inequality leads to redistribute pressures that are reducing 
growth and are introducing disincentives for entrepreneurship. Furthermore 
growth/development is an inequality generating process involving well-known 
growth/development asymmetries (regarding the different time distribution of costs and 
benefits, the asymmetric growth effects on individuals, social groups and, very importantly, 
regions and sectors and finally probability differentials for winners and losers). Policy 
ambiguity regarding appropriate levels of inequality and managing redistribution effects of 
growth/development and social sensitivity represent a formidable challenge. It is important 
to note that without a clear relationship the growth/development concerns managing a 
disequilibrium generating process, not a smooth economic growth trajectory. Similar results 
with acceptable bands of values shifting during the growth/development can be derived for 
the other factors that are or can be under the strong influence of the state.  
 
Of course in real world economies, these fundamental ambiguities are mixed with many 
other considerations determining the growth/development policy environment and its 
political economy. For understanding the political economy of growth/development three 
are especially important. The first is the external environment, the second are 
discontinuities and the third the size of the economy. The Southeast European economies 
provide arguably the best example of the contradictions involved in the mixture.  
 
External influences are crucial for Southeast European economies. For them, relative 
growth/development is clearly defined by nominal and real convergence to EU 
membership. As a result, for these economies relative convergence is to a great degree 
regulated by a contract, conditionalities and self-imposed path determinacy. This leaves an 
unclear but certainly not large scope for national differences. In this sense, they are 
different from many other developing economies. In general terms, the preferences for this 
convergence have been disclosed by the population, though significant differences already 
exist regarding a lot of the "small print" and implications of such convergence shifting.  
 
The importance of discontinuities is also visible. Absolute growth/development is also 
defined for these economies. With respect to that, by the initial development gap these 
economies are facing (Europe's development gradient has a clear discontinuity towards 
the Balkans), the initial conditions they are starting from (regarding growth factors and 
position) and secular growth rates they experienced in the past (if short lived sports of high 
growth are set aside, that is around 3% per year). Again while the population has 
expressed clear preferences for growth, there is impatience regarding the expected growth 
and capabilities of the economy. Satisfying these growth/development expectations 
unavoidably implies a discontinuity with inherited absolute growth/development patterns. 30 
The problems are best seen in the efforts for pro-active growth policies chosen by these 
economies in the last decade. Building on the inherited tradition of state managed 
growth/development (an inheritance which spans both their capitalist and socialist past), 
the policy makers in all of them have shown a strong taste for intervention. High on the 
policy agenda were infrastructure investments (motorways for example) and a continuous 
relapse to an industrial policy based on national champions (in Croatia the authoritarian 
nationalist regime chose the 100 families programme while the social democrats a 
successful managers concord), and similar examples can be found in other Southeast 
European countries. The difficulty is that all these policies at the same time are very 
susceptible to corruption and crony capitalism. 
 
In the case of size, all Southeast European economies are small economies, both with 
regard to population, but especially with regard to their economic size. In the 
growth/development policy context, size imposes some special considerations in a couple 
of aspects. In addition to the usual size imposed constraints for growth/development (the 
quality of policy with civil servants lacking specialization, small human capital pool, 
negative selection in competition with the private sector), there are some additional ones. 
In small economies these policies are a priori personalized both with regard to the actor 
(the policy maker and civil servant are known and recognisable individuals) and the target 
(known and personalized entrepreneur and known region/location and specialization, often 
not only by sector but even by product too). Finally, in small economies there is an 
additional pressure to micromanagement and industrial policies based o n choosing 
national champions and flagship sectors as well as a belief in the ability to recognize 
engines of growth. All these are strong pressures for state led growth. Under the special 
conditions of policy making in small economies such policies, like hose mentioned in the 
previous passage, are very susceptible to corruption and crony capitalism.  
 
Macroeconomic stability is also a growth/development factor whose optimal value is 
indeterminate, but also under the strong influence of economic policy. While excessive 
instability is indisputably bad, a level of excessive stability may also act as a barrier. 
Constant prices prevent changes in relative prices and factor mobility and maybe even 
slow down creative destruction, e.g., constant exchange rates erode firm's competitiveness 
and export redirection. Southeast Europe provides an example of this. While Croatia opted 
for price and exchange rates stability as its primary goal, hoping that this would lead to 
growth/development even after the post-war reconstruction, Slovenia, starting from a very 
similar initial position, opted for controlled low-level instability implied by depreciation and 
low inflation. The latter country ended as the most successful transition economy while the 
disappointing growth record of the former country can be explained by the choice of the 
different macroeconomic policy in addition to special and often unfavourable 
circumstances. Of course the different approach to macro stability is not the whole 
explanation of the difference, but it has certainly contributed to it. 31 
Conclusions 
The paper emphasis the importance of the role of state for reforms and development. It 
especially emphasis the dangers that the weakness or the failure of the state can give rise 
too. Weakness is defined in terms of legitimacy, authority, institutionalization and especially 
in terms of rule of law. Also, when it comes to the use of resources by the state, the stress 
is on the targets and efficiency and not so much on their level. Indeed, weak states, being 
captured states too, often allocate and distribute a lot of resources, which does not 
contribute to their capacity to lead in the reform and development effort. 
 
In the introduction to the paper, we stress the possibility to see the build up of states and 
nations as the outcome of development as much as seeing them as agents of 
development. In the last part, we allude to that treating somewhat sceptically the possible 
conclusion that a strong, legitimate state will be by that fact alone able to pursue a growth 
and development strategy effectively. This is for the lack of knowledge and because many 
other factors play a very significant role. Thus, the contribution that even a well-organized 
state can bring to reforms and ultimately to development has to be supplemented with the 
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